In Living Without Free Will, Derk Pereboom contends that given our best scientific theories, factors beyond our control ultimately produce all of our actions, and. Pereboom, Derk, Living Without Free Will, Cambridge University Press, Derk Pereboom’s recent book is a defence of “hard incompatibilism”. Cambridge Core – Ethics – Living without Free Will – by Derk Pereboom.
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This book is available as part of Oxford Scholarship Online – view abstracts and keywords at book and chapter level. Derk Pereboom articulates and defends an original conception of moral responsibility. He argues that if determinism were true we would not be morally responsible in the key basic-desert sense at issue in the free will debate, but that we would also lack this kind of moral responsibility if indeterminism were true and the causes of our actions were exclusively states or events.
It is possible that if we pereblom undetermined agent-causes-if we as substances had the power to cause decisions without being causally determined to cause them-we would have this kind of free will.
But although our being undetermined agent causes has not been ruled out as a coherent possibility, it’s not credible given our best physical theories. Pereboom then contends that a conception of life without the free will required for moral responsibility in the basic-desert sense would nevertheless allow for a different, forward-looking conception of moral responsibility.
He also argues that our lacking this sort of free will would not jeopardize our sense of ourselves as agents capable of rational deliberation, that it is compatible with adequate measures for dealing with crime and other threatening behavior, and that it allows for a robust sense of achievement and meaning in life. Pereboom’s arguments for this position are reconfigured relative to those presented in Living without Free Willimportant objections to these arguments are answered, and the development of the positive view is significantly embellished.
Defending a Source View 2.
The Prospects for Agent Causal Libertarianism 4. A Manipulation Argument against Compatibilism 5. Free Will Skepticism and Rational Deliberation 6.
Philosophical Disquisitions: Pereboom’s Four Case Argument against Compatiblism
Blame without Basic Desert 7. Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Behavior 8. Personal Relationships and Meaning in Life Bibliography. He is the author of Living Without Free Will CambridgeConsciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism Oxfordand of articles on free will and moral responsibility, philosophy of mind, and the history of modern philosophy, especially Immanuel Kant. For those new comers interested in the state of the contemporary debate which are either interested in Hard Determinism wilo worried about the prospects of alternative views given Determinism this book is a helpful guide for finding your footing.
And for those already familiar with the literature, it will be a welcome addition to your qill.
Of particular interest will be the ways in which Pereboom’s thinking has evolved over the years and the thoughtful attention he gives to criticisms of his earlier work. Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Academic Skip to main content. Choose your country or region Close. Ebook This title is available as an ebook. To purchase, visit your preferred ebook provider.
Oxford Scholarship Online This book is available as part of Oxford Scholarship Online – view abstracts and keywords at book and chapter level. Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life Derk Pereboom Major new work by a pioneer of the view that we don’t have free will Defends a novel and ambitious theory of moral responsibility Draws out the implications for how we see our own lives and others’.
Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism Derk Pereboom. Our Faithfulness to the Past Sue Campbell.
The Impossible Mark Jago. The Sources of Intentionality Uriah Kriegel. Ignorance and Moral Obligation Michael J. The Spiritual Automaton Eugene Marshall.
Being Realistic about Reasons T. Mereology and Location Shieva Kleinschmidt. The Aim of Belief Timothy Chan.
Space, Time, and Stuff Frank Arntzenius.